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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
------------------------------------~----

)
JO ELLEN RAY, fna JO ELLEN
THOMAS, and STATE OF UTAH, by )
)
and through Utah State
Department of Social Services, )
)

Plaintiffs-Respondents,)
)

vs.

)

EDWARD THOMAS,

)
)
)

Case No. 18316

)

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

Appeal from an Order and Judgment of the
Second Judicial District Court for Weber
County, State of Utah, Honorable Calvin
Gould presiding.

ROBERT D. BARCLAY
Deputy Weber County Attorney
First Floor, Municipal Building
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: {801) 399-8459
Attorney for Plaintiffs-respondents
BRUCE R. BAIRD
310 S. Main, 12th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: {801) 363-3300
Attorney for Defendant-appellant.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
------------~--~------~-----------~-~---------------------------

JO ELLEN RAY, fna JO ELLEN
THOMAS, and STATE OF UTAH, by
and through Utah State
Department of Social Services,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,

)
)
)
)

~

Case No. 18316

)
)
)
)
)
)

vs.
EDWARD THOMAS,
Defendant-Appellant.

--~~----~-~--~----~-----------------~--~--------~-~---~-----~---

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for reimbursement for child support
accrued under a Decree o·f Divorce.

Reimbursement is sought

from the support obliger (appellant) by the State of Utah for
periods of time that the support obligee received public assistance from the State of Utah and assigned to the State of Utah
the child support due under the Decree of Divorce.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The State of Utah intervened in the divorce proceeding
and filed an Order to Show Cause seeking reimbursement for
certain periods.

An evidentiary hearing was conducted by the

Honorable Calvin Gould, District Judge.

After considering the

evidence adduced, Judge Gould awarded the State of Utah judgment
in the sum of $3,975.00 as reimbursement for child support
accrued during the periods public assistance was expended for
the benefit of Edward Thomas' dependant minor children.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek affirmance of the Lower Court's
Order and Judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

An Agreed Statement of Record on Appeal has been
filed in this case pursuant to Rule 73(o), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedureo

Additionally, copies of Judge Gould's Memorandum

Decision and the Order and Judgment entered by the Lower Court
are part of record on appeal.

The Agreed Statement of Record

on Appeal are hereinafter referred to by the paragraph numbers
of that Statement.
The Decree of Divorce entered February 8, 1974,
provided that the appellant pay $50.00 per month per child for
the support of his two dependant minor children

(~l

and 2).

Prior to June, 1976, the State of Utah had expended public
assistance for the benefit of the children and sought reimbursement for child support accrued at a hearing on Order to
Show Cause June 22, 1976 (,[3).

At the hearing, the appellant

contested the amount sought by the State of Utah, representing
that payments had been made directly to his ex-wife (,[4).
The Court ordered at that time, upon the specific request of
the State of Utah to avoid confusion in the future, that the
appellant pay

a~l

the Court (,[5).

further child support through the Clerk of
The appellant ignored that order; he only
-2-
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made one payment to the Clerk in 1976 (August) and did not
pay through the Clerk again until December, 1980 ( ~r6) .

The

Court's order that payment be made through the Clerk was not
modified or changed.

The. only explanation that the appellant

made for not having the Clerk's record to verify his alleged
payments was his claim that his ex-wife had asked that payments
be made directly to her ( ,r 13) .
For various periods June, 1976, through December,
1981, the State of Utah expended public assistance for the

benefit of the minor children of appellant. Said assistance
June, 1976 through
was provided for 40 months, I December, 1981; during the remaining 27 months, the appellant's ex-wife did not receive
:public ~ssi~tance and was entitled~~o coll~ct the support due
individually (,(7).

At the evidentiary hearing held on the

State of Utah's Order to Show Cause on December 28, 1981, the
issue was child support paid by appellant during the 40 months
for which public assistance had been expended on behalf of the
children.

The appellant testified that he had made the re-

quired payment for every month in question

(~[11),

but did not

have documentation for any of the claimed payments, except for
those payments made to the Clerk in August, 1976, and subsequent
to December, 1980 (,( 14,10).

Jo Ellen Ray testified that the

appellant had not paid her for every month in question; she
did recall receiving some payments from the appellant, but
did not recall the amounts or whether the payments were made
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during one of the 40 months she was a public assistance
recipient or during· one of the 27 months she was not a public
assistance recipient

(,r

15, 16, 17).

The total child support

accrued during the periods public assistance was expended,
[including that under the modified order

(~

payments verified (,I 10), equalled $3,975.00

8)],less total
(~[

11).

Judgment was awarded the State of Utah in the sum
of $3,975.00 and no credits were allowed to the appellant for
payments which he orally testified were made but for which
he did not have verification.
ARGUMENT
POINT I: ORAL TESTIMONY OF THE
SUPPORT OBLIGOR IS NOT SUFFICIENT
TO ESTABLISH PAYMENT OF A SUPPORT
OBLIGATION.
Appellant argues that the trial court (a) ignored
appellant's oral testimony;

(b) gave appellant's oral testimony

no weight whatsoever; and (c) in essense held appellant to be
an incompetent witness.

Respondents disagree.

In his

Memorandum Decision, Judge Gould stated:
The Court is under more severe restrictions
in fact-finding in a case of this nature than
in an ordinary civil case. Ordinarily, the
oral testimony of a single witness (if believed)
is sufficient for the proof of a fact.
Such,
however, is not the rule in the case at bar.
Under rules which must be applied in accordance
with decisions of the Utah Supreme Court, defendant's efforts to prove payments by oral
testimony must fail.
The proof of payment
having failed, it follows that plaintiffs are
entitled to judgment for $3,975.00
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While respondents agree with appellant that there is
not a case directly on point, respondents submit that the
implicit rule of law, understood by both support obligors and
the Bar and employed by the Utah Supreme Court in its decisions,
is that oral testimony by a support obliger is not sufficient
to establish payment of a support obligationo

Judge Gould

correctly follows such decisions in making the above-quoted order.
Contrary to appellant's position that cases decided by the
Utah Supreme Court provide "little, if any, guidance", several
prior cases decided by the Utah Supreme Court clearly state the
rule and standard used by Judge Gould.
In 1931, Margaret Openshaw obtained a decree of
divorce dissolving her marriage to Clarence R. Openshaw.

Four

different appeals arising from the decree were taken to the
Utah Supreme Court, in addition to several other related appeals.
In the first appeal, Openshaw v. Openshaw, 80 Utah 9, 12 P.2d
364

(1932) , the use of the term "alimony" in the decree is

clarified to include support for Margaret and the children.
Hence, in referring to "alimony" in its decisions, the Court
was ref erring to both spousal and child support and not setting
one against the other as suggested on page 5 of Appellant's
Brief.

The Openshaw cases clearly deal with child support;

however, respondents submit that the issue raised by this appeal
applies to both spousal support and child support and no distinction need, nor should, be made.
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The question of Clarence R. Openshaw's compliance
with the order of support was raised in the second appeal.
In Openshaw v. Openshaw, 86 Utah 229, 42 P.2d 191 (1935),
Mrs. Openshaw admitted that she received payments totalling
$2,374.00 and Mr. Openshaw received credit accordingly.
Mro Openshaw asserted other payments made by him.

However,

The specifics

regarding these other payments is not stated in the opinion,
but at 42 p,.2d, page 193, the Court stated:
As to the other payments alleged to have
been made by him, though they were admitted
as having been received, they were so uncertain in amount that to fix their total
would be speculative. The brirden being upon
the defendant to establish the amount paid,
he must assume the risk of any failure by
reason of indefiniteness. The payments to
the children themselves do not appear to have
been made as payments upon alimony, but were
rather the result of his fatherly interest
in the welfare of those children.
This sets a standard for establishing support payments, to
wit:
(a)

the amount of payment must be certain so

that fixing the total paid is not
(b)

speculation~

the support obliger bears the burden of

proving the amount paid; and
(c)

the support obliger assumes the risk of

any failure in payment by reason of indefiniteness.
Just as Mrs. Openshaw admitted to having received the other
payments, Jo Ellen Ray agreed that she received some payments
but was uncertain as to the amount or frequency of the payments
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or the month of payment [Agreed Statement of Record on
Appeal, ,Jl5, 16].

However, in weighing the testimony of the

appellant and Jo Ellen Ray, the trial court determined that
fixing payments would be speculative and that appellant
failed to carry his burden of proof and was required to assume
the risk for the indefiniteness in payment made.

The trial

court correctly applied the standard set forth in the Openshaw
(second) case.
In the fourth appeal, Openshaw v. Openshaw, 105 Utah
574, 144 P.2d 528 (1943), it is clear that Mr. Openshaw understood the implicit rule of law that support payments must be
verified and establ-ished by evidence other than the oral
testimony of the support obliger.

Mr. Openshaw had attempted

to perpetrate fraud upon the court by submitting checks (verif ication) which had been altered as to the amounts, the payee
and the dates.

It is important to note that Mr. Openshaw went

to the extent of committing fraud upon the court to prove payments by cancelled check rather than to rely upon naked oral
testimony as to payment.
Placing the burden of proving payments upon the
party asserting payment is a general rule applicable to all
civil actions [for example, see:
110 P.2d 327 (1941)].

Bell v. Jones, 100 Utah 87,

The rule was followed, and amplified,

in the case Marks v. Marks, 98 Utah 400, 100 P.2d 207 (1940).
In this case, the defendant had alleged, among other credits,
-7-
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The question of Clarence R. Openshaw's compliance
with the order of support was raised in the second appeal.
In Openshaw

Vs

Openshaw, 86 Utah 229, 42 P.2d 191 (1935),

Mrs. Openshaw admitted that she received payments totalling
$2,374.00 and Mr. Openshaw received credit accordingly.
Mro Openshaw asserted other payments made by him.

However,

The specifics

regarding these other payments is not stated in the opinion,
but at 42 P·e2d, page 193, the Court stated:
As to the other payments alleged to have
been made by him, though they were admitted
as having been received, they were so uncertain in amount that to fix their total
would be speculative. The burden being upon
the defendant to establish the amount paid,
he must assume the risk of any failure by
reason of indefiniteness. The payments to
the children themselves do not appear to have
been made as payments upon alimony, but were
rather the result of his fatherly interest
in the welfare of those children.
This sets a standard for establishing support payments, to
wit:
(a}

the amount of payment must be certain so

that fixing the total paid is not speculation;
(b}

the support obliger bears the burden of

proving the amount paid; and
(c)

the support obliger assumes the risk of

any failure in payment by reason of indefiniteness.
Just as Mrs. Openshaw admitted to having received the other
payments, Jo Ellen Ray agreed that she received some payments
but was uncertain as to the amount or frequency of the payments
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or the month of payment [Agreed Statement of Record on
Appeal, ,(15, 16].

However, in weighing the testimony of the

appellant and Jo Ellen Ray, the trial court determined that
fixing payments would be speculative and that appellant
failed to carry his burden of proof and was required to assume
the risk for the indefiniteness in payment made.

The trial

court correctly applied the standard set forth in the Openshaw
(second) case.
In the fourth appeal, Openshaw v. Openshaw, 105 Utah
574, 144 P.2d 528 (1943), it is clear that Mr. Openshaw understood the implicit rule of law that support payments must be
verified and established by evidence other than the oral
testimony of the support obliger.

Mr. Openshaw had attempted

to perpetrate fraud upon the court by submitting checks (verification) which had been altered as to the amounts, the payee
and the dates.

It is important to note that Mr. Openshaw went

to the extent of committing fraud upon the court to prove payments by cancelled check rather than to rely upon naked oral
testimony as to payment.
Placing the burden of proving payments upon the

-

party asserting payment is a general rule applicable to all
civil actions [for example, see:
110 P.2d 327 (1941)].

Bell v. Jones, 100 Utah 87,

The rule was followed, and amplified,

in the case Marks v. Marks, 98 Utah 400, 100 P.2d 207 (1940).
In this case, the defendant had alleged, among other credits,
-7-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

payments for which he had not been credited by the plaintiff

e

In ruling on the issues before it, the Utah Supreme Court
stated at 100 P.2d, page 210:
It is well settled that payment is an
affirmative defense, and that the party claiming payment has the burden of proving it [citations
omitted]. This rule should especially apply to
cases of this kind, where the debtor can always,
or is usually ordered to, make his payment into
court, where a record is kept, thereby eliminating
any chance of dispute.
The Court then quoted from the Openshaw case,
42 p.2d, at page 193, quoted above.

Concerning the payments

which the defendant claimed to have paid the plaintiff in small
sums and cash, he introduced a check, a sender's receipt for
a money order, and a receipt signed by the plaintiff.

The

Utah Supreme Court determined that the endorsement on the check
was not the plaintiff '·s handwriting, and credit was not allowed.
As to the sender's receipt, the Utah Supreme Court determined
that it was a gift to the son rather than a pqyment of alimony
and did not allow the credit.

The receipt was allowed, as well

as another small check admitted to having been received by the
plaintiff.

The Court did not allow him credit for any payments

he could not verify by evidence other than oral testimony.

It

is implicit in the Supreme Court's discussion of these payments
and the defendant's proffer of evidence other than oral testimony
that the burden of proof placed upon a support obliger requires
verification.
Verification can be made by (a) the support obligee's
admission that the alleged payments were made;

(b) a receipt
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signed by the support obligee;
money order;
strument;

(c) a sender's copy of a

(d) a cancelled check or other negotiable in-

(e) court records; or (f) any other document showing

receipt of monies by the support obligeeo
Two other things are important to note from the
Marks case.

First, the trial court had originally placed the

burden of non-payment on the plaintiff.

This was over-turned

by the Supreme Court and at 100 P.2d, page 210, the Supreme
Court indicated that if the evidence was evenly balanced,
judgment should be awarded in favor of the plaintiff.

Second,

from the language quoted above, i.e., "This rule should especially apply to cases of this kind (emphasis added), where
the debtor can always, and is usually ordered to, make payments
into court, where a record is kept, thereby eliminating any
chance for dispute", a distinction is made between support
cases and other civil cases.

At the June 22, 1976, hearing,

the appellant was cited into court by the State of Utah.

The

appellant was present and it was clear that the child support
was due to the State of Utah and the State of Utah wanted payment through the Clerk to avoid future confusion.

The Clerk

of the Court was not refusing to accept payments from the
appellant.

Jo Ellen Ray denied that she made a request for

direct payments.

This case demonstrates the importance of

making payments through the Clerk of the Court.

-9-

The order to
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pay through the Clerk was not modified or alteredc

The

appellant violated the Court's direct order and assumed the
risk of having not made payments through the Clerk of the Court
and, therefore, not being otherwise able to verify payments
except for his own naked assertions; the appellant should not now
be excused for violating the specific order concerning payments
to the Clerk of the Court.
In the case Ross v. Ross, 592 P.2d 600 (Utah 1979),
the support obliger made several different claims of payments.
After discussing these specific claimed credits, the Supreme
Court at page 604 commented on other credits claimed and restated
the rule that the support obliger has the burden of proving
~~~.

-4-t?,-=:~~-

- --

- -~---

payments and assumes the risk of indefiniteness:
Other amounts for which plaintiff
claims credit were so uncertain as to
amount or actual expenditure as to be
highly speculative, and were paid out of
either a joint checking account which he
had with defendant or his own account
into which defendant deposited her paychecks during that period of time when
the parties attempted reconciliation.
Plaintiff has not met his burden of
proving that these expenditures were
made by him. We therefore do not find
that the evidence clearly preponderates
against the Court's finding that plaintiff
paid only $7,024.00 in child support under
the decree.
It is clear from the above decisions that oral
testimony is not sufficient to meet the burden of proof required
of the support obliger.

The lower court did rule that alleged

payments by appellant were not made.

The trial court considered

both the testimony of payment and the testimony of non-payment
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and, in weighing the same, concluded that the evidence did
not preponderate in favor of the appellant.

Hence, the trial

court ruled that the appellant had not met his burden of proof, and
did not rule tantamount to saying the appellant was not a
competent witness.

Section 78-24-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953

as amended, which is relied upon by appellant, provides that
the credibility of the witness may be drawn in question by
various factors, including his motives, and provides that the
trier of fact is the exclusive judge of credibility.

Judge

Gould heard the testimony and weighed the statements of the
witnesses.

It resulted in a question of whom to believe and

the court's decision, that the _weight of evidence was against
the appellant, should not be overruled on this appeal.

Although

not stated in Judge Gould's decision, the motive of the appellant to avoid repaying a substantial arrearage illustrates why
the standard of proof set forth in the cited cases and the
implicit rule of law is sound and should be affirmatively
stated in upholding Judge Gould's decision on this appeal.
The question of a witness'

motive and its

be~ring

on a support

case is more specifically addressed under Point II.
POINT II: PUBLIC POLICY DICTATES
THAT PAYMENT OF A SUPPORT OBLIGATION
BE VERIFIED.
Two well recognized principles concerning oral testimony
are, first, that the trier of fact is not required to believe
self-serving testimony [see for example: Jensen v. Logan City,
96 Utah 522, 88 P.2d 459 {1939)], and, second, that if testimony
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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is given and no other evidence is offered to the contrary, the
trier of fact is not required to find in accordance with the
testimony [see for example: Moore Vo Prudential Insurance Co:.
of America, 26 Utah 2d 430, 491 P.2d 227 (1971)]

These are

e

not rules which are tantamount to saying that the witness is
incompetent.

These principles apply to all civil cases; however,

in a support case even more restrictive principles should apply.
To rule that in a support case the trier of fact is not required
to give credit for payments established only by the testimony
of the support obligor is consistent with, and mandated, by
public policy.
The paramount consideration is that if a support obliger
can merely come to a hearing and orally assert payments, without
verification by clerk record, cancelled check, receipt, etc., no
support obliger would ever again be delinquent!

The support

obliger could merely testify that he made all required payments
in cash and obtain an order that he is current in his obligation.
Such a possiblity would spawn and encourage perjury.

As a matter

of public policy, even the temptation of perjury should be avoided.
Although perjury is a problem for any witness, the inducement for
perjury to avoid paying support for such a large population of
similarly situated individuals is claerly contrary to public
policy, especially where such perjury can be controlled, or even
avoided, by requiring proper verification of payments.

Further,

the possibility that mere oral testimony could satisfy the burden
of proving payment would make a mocke.ry of the inalienable duties
to provide support.

It would in,most cases be the needy, minor
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children who would suffer from the wholesale opportunity of
support obligors to be declared current merely because they said
so.
An additional consideration is the chaos and burden upon

the courts.

Since support cases are heard before judges as the
.

.

trier of fact, an extreme burden would be placed upon the judiciary
if oral testimony alone could establish payment of a support
obligation.

While our legal system is based upon the trier of fact

deciding who is telling the truth, in S1:lpport cases this would be to
an inordinate extreme.

In case after case after case the testimony

of the support obligee would be pitted against the testimony of the
support obliger -- in some cases payment may have actually been made,
but credit not given, in others it may be given; yet in many other
cases (too many) payment will not have actually been made, but
credit given.

The judiciary would be placed in the chaotic state

of making coin-flips.

There is no reason for such a nightmare when

the reasonable and functional alternative is to require verification
of payments.
These public policy considerations can be extended even
further

to

the welfare setting where collusion could result, e.g.:

the support obligee would receive welfare and then agree, be
threatened, coerced or whatever to co~operate with the support
him
obliger in getting/off-the-hook with the State of Utah; or, more
importantly, the support obliger could have received payment, but
deny the same to avoid hisown welfare fraud. Also, the support obliger
could merely assert payment in cash and further assert that the
~upport

obliger did not, or would not, give him a receipt because

he did not want to be caught in welfare fraud; if the testimony
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were accepted, the support obliger does not have to pay the
accrual and the State of Utah could never prove the welfare
fraud since the support obligee'stestimony was that payment
was not received - for a ruling of payment in one instance,
is not a ruling of fraud in another instance.

Hence, contrary

to the interests of the taxpayers in the State of Utah, the
State of Utah would be unable to collect from either party.
A

rule requiring proof of payment by other than oral testimony

protects the support obligee, the benefactors of the support debt
and any third party who comes to the aid of the support obligee
and the dependant minor children.
To flatly state that oral testimony alone will not
fulfill the burden of proving payment in a support case may
appear harsh at first g1anceo

However, support obligors can

very easily protect themselves from double payments by paying
by check, by money order, through the Court Clerk or insisting
upon a receipt.

Such is not in any way onerous; in fact, such

has been the implicit rule of law followed by support obligors
in the past.

CONCLUSION
The burden of proving payments is placed upon the
person ordered to make payments.

That person can assure

proper credit for all payments by requiring a receipt, paying
by check, or preferably paying to the Clerk of the Court.

In

the matter before the Court, Mr. Thomas was specifically
ordered to pay

thr~ugh

the Clerk of the Court and he violated
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that order.

He assumed the risk of any failure to prove payments

by not making payments through the Clerk of the Court.

Estab-

lishing his payments was speculation and a search in the pararneters of indefiniteness.

As a general principle, he, nor any

other support obliger should not be allowed to merely take the
witness stand and say, "I paid every month.

I am 100% current.

I paid in cash, and due to trust or an oversight, failed to
get a receipt for my cash," when the same is denied by the
equally competent testimony of the support obligee.

While oral

testimony may initially satisfy the burden of producing evidence,
once that testimony is refuted by the support obligee, the
burden shifts back_to the support obliger to go forward·with
evidence beyond mere naked statement of cash payment.

The

support obliger is required to demonstrate definite payment by
some means of verification.

Since this shifting of the burden

of proof is standard in all support cases, the steps of the
the
support obliger's testimony of payment and/support obligee's
testimony of nonpayment should not be necessary

--

the rule

should be made that oral testimony alone will not meet the
.

.

burden of proving payments by a support obliger.

Such a rule

would not preclude the support obliger for soliciting the
testimony of the support obligee in an effort to establish
payment through the support obligee's testimony; but, upon the
support obligee denying the claimed payments, would require
the support obliger to come forward with verification of payment.

The public policy considerations set forth above mandate
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such a rulee
In the instant case, appellant failed to meet the
burden of procf and because of the indefiniteness created
thereby the decision of the lower court was correct and
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

(
Deputy Weber County At o
Attorney for PlaintiffsRespondents
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